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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a key part of 
the international nuclear disarmament regime, entered 
into force in March 1970. A review of past compliance and 
negotiations of future implementation measures takes 
place every five years. At the 2015 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, held this spring at the United Nations 
in New York, parties deliberated for four weeks but did 
not reach consensus on a final document.
Agreement was formally blocked by a dispute over a 
conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone 
free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). More generally, however, the nego-
tiations were marked by a changing climate over nuclear 
disarmament. This change can be attributed to the 
frustrations of a growing number of Non-Nuclear-Weapon 
States (NNWS) over the slow nuclear disarmament pro-
cess on the part of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) – and 
their insistence that progressive steps be taken.
Within the 2015 NPT review conference’s decidedly 
cooler negotiation climate, Germany continued to pursue 
its core interests of fostering nuclear disarmament while 
maintaining international legal agreements and good 
political relations. The German delegation held its estab-
lished, pragmatic course, which it describes as a “bridge-
building” role – that is, bringing together state parties 
that favor quicker and stronger nuclear disarmament 
measures (namely progressive NNWS) with those that 
advocate a slower and weaker process (chiefly the NWS). 
Importantly, this role was reserved in a double sense. For 
one thing, the German delegates favored preserving good 
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relations with Germany’s allied NWS – particularly the 
United States – over stronger disarmament measures, 
which made them biased. For another, Germany mainly 
proposed soft disarmament actions that hardly went be-
yond the minimum, often vague consensus of the interna-
tional community. Due to the reserved nature of policies 
pursued by the delegation from Berlin, the progressive 
NNWS depreciated it as a disarmament partner at the 
conference – a situation that is likely to persist after the 
NPT review conference. As a consequence, Germany was 
less effective in pursuing some of its major national objec-
tives: advancing the process toward nuclear abolition and 
preserving the legal Nonproliferation Treaty. This paper 
argues that Germany can more comprehensively promote 
its core interests in the field – and strengthen the NPT – if 
it redefines its role and evolves into a more robust bridge 
builder, even as it retains its pragmatic approach. 
The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the 
Changing Nuclear Disarmament Climate
Agreement at this year’s NPT review conference was for-
mally blocked in the final plenary meeting by the US, sup-
ported by the UK and Canada, over Egypt’s demand that 
concrete timelines be set for a conference on the estab-
lishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. In addition to 
this, however, there were once again substantial contro-
versies within the NPT forum regarding nuclear disarma-
ment itself. There have long been divisions within the 
treaty community between NWS that favor slower and 
weaker nuclear disarmament steps and those progressive 
NNWS that aim for more rapid and stronger measures. 
Although these differences have long been known, a 
frostier climate prevailed at this spring’s disarmament 
talks, widening the gap even further. 
Arguably the core cause for the shifting atmosphere 
is the changing position of an increasing number of 
NNWS – chief among them Austria, but also including 
Mexico, Costa Rica, South Africa, and many others. These 
countries are not only frustrated with the lagging pace of 
nuclear cutbacks but have also run out of patience over 
the slow disarmament process and insist on progressive 
steps. An important new development in this regard is the 
rise of the so-called humanitarian initiative.1 Although 
underway since roughly the middle of the last decade, the 
initiative appeared notably on the international stage in 
2010, when the humanitarian cause was referenced in 
the final document of that year’s NPT Review Conference. 
The initiative focuses on the catastrophic consequences 
of any nuclear weapons detonation. Three international 
conferences have so far been held to examine and publi-
cize arguments underpinning this view: in Norway (2013), 
Mexico (2014), and finally Austria (2014). A total of 156 
states as well as various civil society organizations and 
other parties participated. The focus on catastrophic con-
sequences of nuclear explosions not only provided new 
momentum for the debate on nuclear disarmament but 
also supplied grounds for arguing for a swifter disarma-
ment process.
One prominent progressive proposal was put forward 
by Austria at the international conference in 2014. In tak-
ing the “Austrian Pledge,” the country commits to “iden-
tify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for 
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”2 At 
the end of the 2015 NPT review conference, this call and 
its underlying humanitarian arguments were supported 
by 107 of the treaty’s member states – indicating the trac-
tion this perspective has gained. (Five years earlier, at 
the 2010 review conference, it was mentioned in just one 
sentence in the final conference communiqué.) Moreover, 
in their national statements at the conference, various 
NNWS endorsed negotiations on a legal text calling for 
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear arms. Accord-
ing to many NNWS and civil society groups, a “ban-treaty” 
could in fact be put up for consideration outside the NPT 
format and, if necessary, without the participation of all 
NPT parties.3
Against the backdrop of this new climate – and appar-
ently unimpressed by it – Germany sought throughout the 
conference to advance its core nuclear disarmament inter-
est by sticking to its established approach and traditional 
understanding of its role.
Germany’s Interests and its Current Role in 
Nuclear Disarmament
Despite the diverse interpretations of its domestic politi-
cal parties, Germany’s underlying national interest within 
the NPT and the field of nuclear disarmament more 
broadly has at least two dimensions. First, it wishes to 
advance the cause of nuclear abolition. Second, it seeks 
to maintain and be compliant with international legal 
regimes such as the NPT itself and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) while cultivating good 
political relations with its allies.4 It has long been known 
that achieving both interests simultaneously can be dif-
ficult. Germany’s closest international partners comprise 
several NWS, including the US, the UK, and France, all of 
which see nuclear weapons as a substantial part of their 
defense postures and therefore advocate slow, merely in-
cremental disarmament measures. Moreover, Germany is 
a member of NATO, an organization that insists on includ-
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ing nuclear armaments in its military capability mix and 
relies on nuclear deterrence in its defense posture. But 
these positions frequently stand in contrast with signifi-
cant and swiftly implemented disarmament steps favored 
by many NNWS allied to Germany.
These general nuclear disarmament interests crystal-
lized, among other goals, in a concrete objective at the 
2015 NPT review conference: reaching an agreement 
by all states on a final communiqué. Such a text would 
have symbolized international agreement on the road to 
nuclear abolition. As a text agreeable to Germany’s allied 
nuclear- and non-nuclear-armed states, it would have 
addressed Germany’s core interest in maintaining good 
political relations without contradicting its legal commit-
ments, or those of its nuclear allies, within NATO. More-
over, it would have maintained the NPT as an effective ne-
gotiation body and moved ahead on nuclear disarmament 
inasmuch as deemed possible.
Germany was trying to move ahead on the above-
mentioned core national interests without sacrificing 
either one. Its approach involved taking steps where 
both interests intersected. In the concrete formulation 
of its nuclear disarmament policies and activities, this 
pragmatic approach translated into a “bridge-building” 
role: bringing together state parties that favor quicker 
and stronger nuclear disarmament measures (namely 
progressive NNWS) with those that advocate a slower 
and weaker process (chiefly the NWS). Prime examples of 
such bridge-building activities would be suggesting mutu-
ally acceptable language for the NPT final communiqué or 
suggesting initiatives that both groups could support.
At present, however, Germany’s self-proclaimed 
“bridge-building” role is at best reserved. On the NPT 
conference negotiating floor, Germany did indeed posi-
tion itself between the two aforementioned blocs but 
leaned toward the positions of the NNWS. In other words, 
it favored upholding good relations with its allied NWS 
(and its NATO commitments) over the stronger disarma-
ment measures progressive NNWS had proposed. This 
bias was illustrated, for example, by Berlin’s idea of how 
disarmament should take place in general terms. As usual, 
Germany promoted an open-ended approach determined 
by (and mainly serving the interests of) the NWS, instead 
of taking a more balanced position between this and a 
time-bound strategy favored by progressive NNWS. Am-
bassador Michael Biontino reiterated the German stance 
at the conference by referring to the “concrete security 
and political context” and “trust between partners,” 
which would presuppose the implementation of nuclear 
disarmament measures and would make an open-ended, 
step-by-step process the only valid way forward.5
Moreover, Germany took a soft line on substantive nu-
clear disarmament issues. Although addressing virtually 
all the issues on the table in the NPT negotiations, most 
German proposals hardly went beyond the minimum 
consensus in the international community, missed the 
chance to include clear edges and introduce new aspects, 
and were thus unable to move discussions to an elevated 
level. A case in point was its promotion of the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), one of the topics on 
which Berlin provided a working paper.6 Describing the 
pact as an “invaluable component of the nuclear disarma-
ment and non-proliferation regime,” Germany continued 
urging all states to ratify the CTBT and endorsed several 
related points from the 2010 NPT Action Plan. However, 
such a call merely repeats ideas reached in a minimum of 
consensus by all state parties over the past twenty years. 
Firm initiatives favoring disarmament were not proposed 
in 2015. If such policies appeared in the past – one ex-
ample being the push to include tactical nuclear weapons 
in the reduction process in 2010 – Germany indeed pro-
moted them but cut back on substance relatively quickly 
after the proposal met resistance.
Consequences of the Changing Negotiation 
Climate for Germany’s Interests and Role
Until recently, Germany’s reserved understanding of its 
role might to some extent have served its core interests 
within the NPT. Due to the shifting stance of a large 
portion of the non-nuclear-armed community, however, 
its conception made the role less effective at the 2015 
NPT review conference – a development that is likely to 
continue in the future. In essence, the growing number 
of frustrated and progressive NNWS depreciated Ger-
many as a disarmament partner because it placed itself 
too close to the agenda of NWS and proposed merely soft 
disarmament measures – the very grounds for the NNWS’ 
aggravation.
Several indications for how Germany lost credibility 
could be observed during the 2015 diplomatic meeting. 
Statements issued by Germany as well as by the main 
groupings it belongs to – namely the Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the EU – had no 
significant impact and were unable to close any notewor-
thy gaps on nuclear disarmament topics. On the matter of 
the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the 
majority of NNWS ignored Germany’s stance – which it 
had expressed in a statement at the UN General Assembly 
First Committee on Disarmament in 20147 – while 107 
of them joined the stronger Austrian Pledge instead. In 
the informal discussions in Main Committee I (covering 
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nuclear disarmament), the Netherlands, not Germany, 
represented the interest of the NPDI. On the formally de-
cisive issue of the conference – the WMD-free zone in the 
Middle East – Germany was neither an influential actor 
during negotiations nor active in the final discussion of 
the text, which involved the US, the UK, and Egypt. The 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of like-minded 
and progressive NNWS within the NPT, was again reluc-
tant to engage constructively with Germany.
These and similar developments had several negative 
consequences for Germany’s pursuit of its underlying 
nuclear disarmament interest. As Germany diverged from 
the growing group of progressive NNWS, it became less 
able to significantly advance nuclear disarmament at the 
NPT forum – be it as a bridge builder or in any other role. 
Furthermore, the stability of the NPT itself was further 
weakened in the absence of another actor promoting a 
middle position between member states as they drifted 
apart. The persistent lack of consensus among state 
parties testifies to this deterioration. Although various 
countries need to be held accountable for the failure to 
reach agreement, Germany, too, shares responsibility; it 
merely tried in a reserved manner to pave the way for a 
common position.
Looking ahead to the near future, Germany’s role 
is likely to remain only partly effective in advancing 
nuclear disarmament and preserving high esteem for the 
NPT. Already at the NPT review conference, progressive 
NNWS – and in particular countries that had signed on 
to the humanitarian initiative – signaled that they would 
push through on negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear 
weapons.8 As Germany does not support such a process 
and can be expected to stay out of deliberations (or, at 
most, engage passively), it will be unable to play a consid-
erable role in this step toward nuclear abolition. Moreover 
the negotiations might redirect attention away from the 
NPT, though not weaken its central provisions, as the ban 
process might take place outside of the NPT framework.
Fortunately for policy makers in Berlin, maintaining 
their reserved stance will still to some degree promote 
Germany’s core interests. The emerging climate is 
unlikely to affect Germany’s relations with NWS and its 
standing within NATO; these might even grow stronger, 
as Germany stays committed to NWS-friendly policies in 
the face of rising opposition. Nuclear disarmament might 
meanwhile advance through the activities of progressive 
NNWS, measures taken by NWS, and Germany’s own 
actions in support of those efforts. Although destabilized, 
the NPT can be expected to stay an important interna-
tional treaty, with Germany as a compliant member.
The Alternative: Becoming a Robust Bridge 
Builder
One option for Germany is for it to stick to its estab-
lished policies and accept the implications outlined above. 
After all, to some extent it serves German national in-
terests to do so. However, it is conceivable that Germany 
can advance its current disarmament objectives within 
the NPT context and beyond in a more comprehensive 
way, while maintaining international agreements and 
relations. By evolving into a robust bridge builder in the 
field of nuclear disarmament, the country could retain its 
pragmatic approach while redefining the concrete role 
following from it.
The idea of acting as a robust bridge builder differs 
from the current and reserved role in two essential 
aspects. First, it takes a balanced stance between the two 
conflicting blocs, namely the NWS and the progressive 
NNWS. Respecting both sides with equal seriousness is 
essential in this regard. Second, and in close relation, it 
formulates a firm position that incorporates the diverging 
interests while going beyond each of them in order to as-
sume a stance that is elevated above them both. 
Although it is impossible to mediate between mutually 
exclusive demands, it is prudent and possible in principle 
to mediate on most of the negotiation points within the 
NPT. Many of the issues on the table describe conflicts 
over the speed of progress, the next steps, thresholds, and 
timelines. An example of a policy that could result from a 
more robust bridge-building role could be a proposal for 
concrete but generous timelines for nuclear disarmament 
measures, such as for the ratification of the CTBT. Such 
a proposal would not only advance nuclear disarmament 
by providing benchmarks but also incorporate the call of 
progressive NNWS for tangible dates, while at the same 
time, respecting the position of NWS by proposing a 
slow process for subjects they are committed to in more 
general terms.
Importantly, redefining its stance would still respect, 
or enhance, all of Germany’s above-mentioned core 
interests. Progressive NNWS can be expected to consider 
a more balanced German strategy as an act of rapproche-
ment and consequently revise their view of the country 
in more positive terms. This would enable Germany to 
take on a significant position on disarmament matters, 
augmenting its chances of facilitating consensus within 
the NPT and moving the international community closer 
toward nuclear abolition. Moreover, decreasing the differ-
ences within the NPT community would make the treaty 
and its final document more likely to remain meaningful.
A new understanding of Germany’s role would also 
take into account – and duly respect –Germany’s relations 
Becoming a Robust Bridge Builder  4
DGAPkompakt  / Nr. 11 / September 2015
with allied NWS and commitments made in NATO. While 
certain NATO policies, including the possibility of using 
of nuclear weapons in extremely remote circumstances as 
well as nuclear sharing arrangements, can still translate 
into red lines for Germany’s stance, the interests of allied 
NWS would be incorporated into its balanced position. 
What is new here is that Germany, in order to take a firm 
middle position, would be prepared for a degree of dis-
agreement with its nuclear-armed partners.9
If Germany has avoided this attitude in the past, this is 
because it has historically been difficult for it to embark 
on a somewhat confrontational though multilaterally-
oriented approach to its NATO allies. However, these 
very states (alongside an increasing number of domestic 
and other foreign parties) have called on Berlin to take 
more responsibility globally. Following up on such a call 
involves being exposed to and ready for criticism on the 
German side, while allied NWS should be expected to 
handle German emancipation.
The role shift proposed here will not be easy to carry 
out in the current strategic context. There has been a 
significant increase in the importance of nuclear weapons 
in military operations – and in the thinking – of some 
actors, especially since the escalation of the conflict in 
Ukraine. Such nuclear postures fundamentally contradict 
the view of progressive NNWS that these weapons should 
have no role whatsoever in military strategies. Nuclear 
disarmament steps, even small ones, appear to be out 
of reach. However, the importance of promoting robust 
bridge-building polices in this thorny context is even 
more urgent than it was in the more disarmament-friend-
ly environment that prevailed five years ago. Sensibly 
balanced policies and activities on the part of Germany 
would increase the chances of bringing the international 
community together and curtailing nuclear postures as 
much as possible. Although significant nuclear disarma-
ment measures may not be attainable, Germany’s firm 
stance would be more effective in keeping the theme of 
nuclear restrictiveness on the international agenda.
Sascha Knöpfel is an associate fellow in the DGAP’s 
Transatlantic Relations program and a PhD candidate at 
the University of Hamburg.
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